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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992). Pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on April 3, 1992.

The

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiff

agreed to have its materials ready for shipment no later than July
22, 1989?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot
be set aside on appeal unless they are "clearly erroneous."
R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Utah

The evidence is evaluated in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party.
639 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1981).

Higains v. City of Fillmore,

When the evidence is in conflict,

the appellate court presumes that the trial court relied on the
evidence supporting its findings. i£. The appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then show
that# despite this evidence, the findings are so lacking in support
that they are "against the clear weight of the evidence" or leave
the appellate court with "a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760,

- 1 -

761 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted); In re Estate of Bartell, 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiff

breached its agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment no
later than July 22, 1989, and that the defendant was injured by the
plaintiff's untimely delivery?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see
also supra issue 1, "Standard of Review."
3.

Did the trial court err in finding that the defendant

made reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages?
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); see
also supra issue l, "Standard of Review."
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the defendant

was entitled to an offset for overtime it had paid?
Standard of Review: Whether or not the defendant was entitled
to an offset is a mixed question of law and fact.

To the extent

the trial court's ruling is based on its construction of the
applicable statutes, it is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Forbes v.
St. Mark's Hospital. 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988).

However, to

the extent it is based on the court's findings of fact, it will not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
See also Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987) (if the
- 2 -

trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the
appellate court will merely determine whether those findings
justify the trial court's legal conclusions); LaGrand Steel Prods.
Co. v, A.S.C. Constructors. Inc.f 702 P.2d 855, 856 (Idaho Ct.
App.) (when faced with mixed questions of law and fact, the
appellate court defers to facts found on substantial evidence but
freely reviews the application of the law to the facts), review
denied. 776 P.2d 828 (Idaho 1985).

Moreover, the appellate court

will not reverse a judgment based on a trial court's error unless
the error was substantial and prejudicial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
See also Ashton, 733 P.2d at 154 (appellant has the burden of
showing

that

the

trial

court's

error

was

substantial

and

prejudicial).
5.

Did the plaintiff properly raise its claim that the

defendant caused the untimely delivery?
Standard of Review;

Whether an issue is properly before the

court on appeal depends on whether or not it was raised "to a level
of consciousness" such that the trial court had an opportunity to
make findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the
issue.

See LeBaron & Assocs.. Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.r 823

P.2d 479, 483 & n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
6.

Did

the defendant's

actions

untimely delivery?

- 3 -

excuse

the

plaintiff's

Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact cannot
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

If

the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous, the appellate
court will merely determine whether those findings justify the
trial court's legal conclusions.

Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Sections 70A-2-714, -715 and -717 of the Utah Code may be
determinative of the fourth issue.

Section 70A-2-714 states, in

relevant part:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given
notification [of any breach] . . . he may recover as
damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
seller's breach as determined in any manner which is
reasonable.

(3) In a proper case any
incidental and
consequential damages under the next section may also be
recovered.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-714 (1990).
Section 70A-2-715 states:
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's
breach
include
expenses
reasonably
incurred
in
inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody
of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable
charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident
to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential
seller's breach include

damages

- 4 -

resulting

from

the

(a) any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury
to person
or property
proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty.
I£. § 70A-2-715.
Section 70A-2-717 states:
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention
to do so may deduct all or any part of the damages
resulting from any breach of the contract from any part
of the price still due under the same contract.
Id. § 70A-2-717.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The plaintiff and appellant, Ohline Corporation, brought this

action claiming that the defendant, Granite Mill, owed it money for
goods that Ohline had sold to Granite Mill.

Record ("R.") at 2.

Granite Mill acknowledged that it received the goods but claimed it
was entitled to an offset in the amount of the unpaid purchase
price

because

Ohline

had

delivering the goods late.
B.

breached

the

parties' contract by

See id. at 26-28.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
The matter was tried to the court on September 20, 1991. At

the conclusion of the trial, the court stated on the record its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

- 5 -

R. at 75-84.

The court

then entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, id,
at 58-64 (see Addendum) f in which it concluded that Ohline had
agreed to have the materials it sold to Granite Mill ready for
shipment no later than July 22, 1989, that Ohline had breached this
agreement and that its breach had damaged Granite Mill in the
amount of $9,405, an amount equal to or in excess of all amounts
Granite Mill otherwise would have owed Ohline•

Based on its

findings and conclusions, the court entered a judgment in favor of
Granite Mill and against Ohline. Xd. at 66-67.
C.

Statement of Facts
In April 1989 Granite Mill entered into a contract with the

Las Vegas Hilton Corporation for the remodeling of certain suites
in the Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The contract required

that the work be completed on or before August 4, 1989. R. at 59
f 2, 141-44; ex. 19-D.

The suites had been rented beginning on

August 4, 1989, and if Granite Mill did not complete the job by
that date, it would have to pay for the suites until they were
available.

R. at 144.

Granite Mill

negotiated

with

Ohline

to manufacture

the

shutters for the remodeling project. A specific and firm delivery
schedule was very important to Granite Mill because the entire
project was to take only a little more than three months and there
were substantial
complete

liquidated

the work

on

damages if Granite Mill did not

time.

Granite

- 6 -

Mill

communicated

the

importance of the delivery date to Ohline during its negotiations
with Ohline.

Id. at 144-46.

On May 5, 1989, Granite Mill

submitted to Ohline Purchase Order No. 2903 for 288 shutters. !£.
at 95; ex. 1-P.

On May 10, 1989, Granite Mill cancelled the order

until credit and payment terms could be resolved. R. at 95; ex. 1P.

On May 15, 1989, Chuck Pace, Ohline7s national contract sales

manager who had negotiated the purchase order, see R. at 93 & 11314, told Wayne Hickenlooper, Granite Mill's vice-president for
sales, that the shutters would be ready for shipment by the third
week in July at the latest and hopefully "mid month." I£. at 111,
119, 132, 138-39; ex. 2-P.

In reliance on this agreement, on May

17, 1989, Granite Mill reinstated the order and submitted a check
for the required deposit. R. at 147-48, 150; exs. 2-P, 3-P & 4-P.
The purchase order had originally specified that the shutters would
"be ready for pickup 7-1-89."

See ex. 1-P.

After the order was

reinstated, Chuck Pace changed the date on the purchase order to
"Mid July."

See ex. 3-P; R. at 115 & 119.

On June 6, 1989, Granite Mill faxed to Ohline the final
measurements, and Ohline began production of the shutters. See R.
at 102; ex. 6-P.

Ohline never asked to change the delivery date,

and no change in the delivery date was ever made.

See R. at 61 J

10.
On Saturday, July 22, 1989, Chuck Pace made the first delivery
of shutters to the job site. He drove a pickup truck carrying some
- 7 -

86 or 87 shutters from Ohline's office in Gardena, California, to
Las Vegas, Nevada, arriving after 4:00 p.m.

R. at 103, 128 & 181.

The balance of the order was shipped with a commercial shipper in
two shipments.

Id. at 104.

Thirty-three units were shipped on

Tuesday, July 25, and sixty-eight units were shipped on Wednesday,
July 26.x Exs. 7-P & 8-P.

Granite Mill did not receive all of the

shutters until the afternoon of Friday, July 28. R. at 176.
If all the shutters had been ready for shipment by July 22, as
agreed, they could have been installed by August 4 without using
any overtime. See id. at 183-85, 62 f 13. Instead, as a result of
the late shipments, Granite Mill had to work 435 hours of overtime
so that it could finish installing the shutters by August 4.
at 196 & 207; ex. 16-D.

Id.

It had to pay $9,405 above its regular

hourly rates for this overtime work. Ex. 16-D; R. at 153-54, 16768.

The shutters were installed by noon on August 4, 1989. R. at

156.

Granite Mill has paid the contract price for the shutters,

less $9,405. Id. at 214A.2

1

One unit consisted of two or possibly three panels.

R.

at 105.
2

Some of the pages in the trial transcript, R. 86-231,
were not numbered as part of the record on appeal. Unnumbered
pages will be referred to by the record number of the preceding
page and the letter &.
- 8 -

SqtWARY QF ARgUMEflT
Ohline has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, so it is precluded from challenging those
findings on appeal*

Nevertheless, the trial court's findings that

Ohline was aware of Granite Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline; that
Ohline was aware of the importance of a specific and firm delivery
schedule; that Ohline agreed to have the shutters ready for
shipment by July 22, 1989, at the latest; that the parties never
agreed

to

a

later

delivery

date;

that

Ohline

breached

its

agreement; that, as a result, Granite Mill was injured in the
amount of $9,405 and that Granite Mill took reasonable steps to
mitigate its damages were all supported by substantial evidence and
support the trial court's legal conclusion that Granite Mill was
entitled to an offset in the amount of $9,405.
ARGUMENT
I.
OHLINE'S CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL
FINPINQS MUST FAIL SECAysg OHLINE HAS NOT M^RSHAkSD
THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS.
Ohline claims that the trial court erred in finding that it
was aware of Granite Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline for completing
the work on the Las Vegas Hilton, that Ohline agreed to have the
shutters ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, that
Ohline breached its agreement when it failed to have the materials
_ 9_

ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989, that Granite Mill
was injured by the untimely delivery and that Granite Mill made
reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages.
The burden of overturning factual findings

f,

is a heavy onef

reflective of the fact that [an appellate court does] not sit to
retry cases submitted on disputed facts." In re Estate of BartellP
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).

The appellate court gives great

deference to the trial court's findings, especially when, as here,
"they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony."
Id. (citations omitted). To challenge successfully a trial court's
findings of fact, the appellant "must marshal the evidence in
support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them
'clearly erroneous.'" Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193

(Utah

1987)).

Ohline has simply

reargued

its case by

recounting a version of the facts most favorable to its position
while ignoring evidence that supported the trial court's findings.
That alone is grounds to reject Ohline's challenge to the trial
court's findings. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.f 817 P.2d 789,
799 (Utah 1991); Evans ex rel. Evans v. Dotyr 824 P.2d 460, 469
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

When, as here, the appellant fails to marshal the

evidence, the reviewing court can assume that the record supports
- 10 -

the verdict.

Saunder^ v. Sharp. 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991);

Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
Nevertheless, the trial court's findings were supported by
substantial evidence.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT OHLINE AGREED
TO HAVE THE SHUTTERS READY FOR SHIPMENT NO LATER THAN
JULY ?3, 1999.
The trial court's findings that Ohline was aware of the
importance of a firm delivery date and specifically agreed to have
the shutters ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989, were
supported by substantial evidence.

Wayne Hickenlooper of Granite

Mill testified that he told Chuck Pace of Ohline that Granite Mill
was

"up against

an August

4th drop dead

deadline" when he

negotiated the purchase order with Ohline, R. at 144, and again in
a telephone conversation with Mr. Pace on May 15, 1989, id. at 14647, before reinstating the purchase order.

On May 17, 1989, Mr.

Hickenlooper sent Ohline a letter memorializing his May 15, 1989,
conversation with Chuck Pace of Ohline.

The letter said, "Chuck

Pace stated that the shutters would be ready for shipment by the
third week in July - 'Hopefully Mid Month'."

- 11 -

Ex* 2-P. Chuck Pace

testified that that was "exactly what I told Mr- Hickenlooper." R.
at 111; see also id. at 118-19.3
Mr. Hickenlooper testified that he understood Ohline to mean
July 21, 1989, when it said that the shutters would be ready for
delivery by the third week in July.4

See R. at 139 & 163.

The

trial court, however, took judicial notice of the fact that the end
of the third week in July was Saturday, July 22, 1989. Id[. at 13435.

Giving Ohline the benefit of the doubt as to what the parties

intended by "the third week in July," the trial court concluded
that Ohline had agreed to have the shutters ready for shipment July
22, 1989, at the latest.

See id. at 78.

Perhaps the best evidence of the parties' agreement and of
Ohline's understanding of the importance of the delivery date was
what Ohline's agent, Chuck Pace, did. Although Mr. Pace testified
that there was no specific date for delivery of the shutters and

3

Moreover, Mr. Pace testified that, sometime after May 22,
1991, he changed the purchase order to show that the shutters would
be ready by "Mid July" rather than the original date of July 1,
1989. R. at 115, 117, 119 & 132; ex. 3-P.
4

Gary Sandberg, Granite Mill's president, also testified
that the parties' agreement was that the shutters would be
delivered by July 21. Mr. Sandberg visited Ohline around July 10
to emphasize to Ohline the critical nature of the delivery date.
Mr. Sandberg testified that Mr. Pace and Ohline's president both
told him that the shutters would be delivered by July 21. R. at
211-12.
- 12 -

that Ohline never committed to specific dates in its business,5 see
R. at 96, 98, 217-17A, Mr. Pace, whose responsibilities did not
include driving a truck and who drove a truck

M

on very rare

occasion11 and then only locally, !£. at 111, 127-28, testified that
he personally drove a pickup truck with some 86 or 87 shutters from
Ohline's Gardena, California, office to Las Vegas, Nevada—a four
and one-half hour drive—on a Saturday afternoon so that Granite
Mill would have the shutters by Monday morning,
29.

i£i. at 103, 128-

The trial court properly concluded that Mr. Pace's actions

spoke louder than his words.

See id. at 80-81.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT OHLINE
BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE MATERIALS READY
FOR SHIPMENT ON OR BEFORE JULY 22, 1989.
The trial court's finding that Ohline breached its agreement
to have the shutters ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989,
was supported by substantial evidence.

The evidence showed that,

at most, one-third of the shutters were ready for shipment on July
22, 1989.

R. at 103-04 & 176.

Another thirty-three units

(approximately sixty-six shutters) were not shipped until Tuesday,
July 25, 1989, and the remaining shutters were not shipped until
6

The trial court expressly disbelieved Mr.
testimony on these points, R. at 78-79, as it was entitled
See Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1991) (it
province of the trier of fact to assess the credibility
witnesses).
- 13 -

Pace's
to do.
is the
of the

Wednesday, July 26, 1989, and not received until Friday afternoon,
July 28, 1989, £ge exs. 7-P & 8-P; R. at 105 & 176. That Ohline's
failure to have the shutters ready for shipment on or before July
22, 1989, was a material breach is shown by the fact that it cost
Granite Mill $9,405—about 20 percent of the contract price of
$45,215.76.*
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT GRANITE MILL
TOOK REASONABLE STEPS TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES.
Ohline argues that Granite Mill should have been able to
install the shutters with only 120 hours of overtime, rather than
the 435 hours it actually took, and that Granite Mill therefore did
not reasonably mitigate its damages. Ohline bases this argument on
the testimony of Scott Colledge, Granite Mill's representative on
the job site, and simple arithmetic.

Mr. Colledge testified that

he had thirteen men installing shutters.

R. at 182-83 & 199.

Ohline reasons that, with ten days in which to install the shutters
and with thirteen men available for eight hours per day, Granite
Mill had 1,040 man hours in which to install the shutters.

Mr.

Colledge further testified that it took approximately 1,160 hours
to install the shutters.

Thus, Ohline concludes, Granite Mill

6

The $9,405 was not the total cost to Granite Mill but
only the premium it had to pay, above its regular hourly rates, for
the overtime work necessary to install the shutters by August 4,
1989. See R. at 154-56; ex. 16-D.
- 14 -

should have been able to install the shutters with only 120 hours
of overtime (1,160 hours minus 1,040 hours)*
The problem with Ohline's argument is not its arithmetic but
the fact that it is divorced from reality and ignores all the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Granite Mill
reasonably mitigated its damages.
For example, Ohline assumes that Granite Mill had ten full
days to install the shutters.

In fact, Granite Mill only had at

roost nine and one-half working days to install the shutters since
it had to be off the job by noon on August 4, 1989. See R. at 19394.7
More important, Ohline assumes that all the shutters were
available from the first day of work, and they were not. Although
Granite Mill received the initial shipment of shutters late on
Saturday, July 22, it did not receive the bulk of the shutters
until Friday, July 28, 1989—nearly a week later.

Because it did

not have all of the shutters available when it first began
installing them, it could not use thirteen men for eight hours a
day for the entire ten days.

In fact, Mr. Colledge testified that

four men were able to install the first load of shutters beginning

7

Ohline's argument also ignores the fact that Granite Mill
had to install the shutters in time to complete all its other work
under the contract by noon on August 4, and some of that work could
not be finished until the shutters were installed.
- 15 -

July 24 working straight time, not overtime.

R. at 175-76, 182.

See also id. at 166.
Ohline also assumes Granite Mill could use thirteen men to
install shutters for each hour of each working day from July 24
until August 4. In fact, Mr. Colledge testified that the number of
men he could use installing shutters on any given day was a product
of several factors, including the amount of product Granite Mill
had to work with, the Hilton's schedule, the number of qualified
men that the union supplied for that day and the space available to
work in.
number.

R. at 201-02 & 205-06.
Id* at 201.

Thirteen was just an average

Because Granite Mill did not know when it

would have the shutters to install, it could not effectively use
thirteen men installing shutters for every hour of every working
day. Installation of the shutters was just a small part of Granite
Mill's work on the Hilton. See id. at 158. Granite Mill could not
put off its other work while it waited for the shutters to arrive
and still meet its August 4 deadline, and it could not expect
thirteen people to immediately drop everything they were doing when
the shutters finally did arrive and work only on installing the
shutters.
Similarly, Ohline assumes that it would take the same time to
install the shutters regardless of when they were delivered.

In

fact, the later the shutters were received, the longer it took to
install them since Granite Mill had to work around the other work
- 16 -

being done on the project.

Had all the shutters been on the site

by July 24, Granite Mill could have installed them as scheduled,
before the suites were carpeted and furnished.

But because the

second and third deliveries of shutters were late, Granite Mill had
to use extra men to move furniture out of the rooms before it could
install the shutters and had to use extra men to replace the
furniture and clean the carpet and floors after the shutters were
installed.

Id. at 199.

Moreover, stacking extra workers in an

area reduced their productivity because their working space was
reduced and had to be shared with other workers doing other tasks.
Id. at 177-78.

The longer one worked on the job, the less space

one had to work in, making it difficult to do the same job with the
same number of people in the same amount of time. See id, at 199.
Thus, a job that could be done with thirteen people on Monday could
not necessarily be done in the same time with thirteen people on
Friday.
Finally, Ohline ignores the testimony that Granite Mill worked
as many regular hours as it could to install the shutters, id. at
206-07, that it could not have installed the shutters by August 4
working only regular hours, id. at 177-78, that, when it became
apparent that Granite Mill could complete the work by its deadline
without additional overtime, it did not work any more overtime, id.
at 186, and that it never authorized any overtime that was not
necessary, id. at 213.

From all this evidence, the trial court
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could reasonably conclude, as Mr. Colledge testified, see id. at
182 & 206, that, given the late deliveries, Granite Mill could not
have done anything else to mitigate its damages.11

V.
GRANITE MILL WAS ENTITLED TO AN OFFSET FOR THE
OVERTIME IT PAID.
Ohline next argues that the trial court erred in concluding
that Granite Mill was entitled to an offset for the overtime it
paid.
Under section 2-717 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer
who notifies the seller of his intention to do so "may deduct all
or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of the
contract from any part of the price still due under the same
contract."

Seg Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990).

Thus, if

Granite Mill was entitled to damages for Ohline's breach of its
agreement to have the shutters ready for delivery by July 22, 1989,

•
Ohline's suggestion that Granite Mill would have suffered
the same damages even if it had received all of the shutters on
July 22, 1989, see Brief of Appellant at 13, suffers from the same
problems as its failure-to-mitigate argument. Not only does it
ignore the practicalities of the situation Granite Mill was faced
with, but it also ignores Mr. Colledge's unequivocal testimony
that, if all the shutters had been delivered by Friday, July 21,
1989, they all could have been installed without any overtime work.
R. at 183-85.
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then Granite Mill was entitled to offset the amount of its damages
against the price still owing under the contract,9
Under section 2-714 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer
who has accepted goods is entitled to recover as damages "the loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach
as determined in any manner which is reasonable," including tf[i]n
a proper case any incidental and consequential damages" recoverable
under section 2-715.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-714(l) & (3)

(1990) .
Incidental damages recoverable under section 2-715 include
expenses incurred in rejecting the goods, expenses incurred in
effecting cover and "any other reasonable expense incident to the
delay or other breach." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715(l). The trial
court concluded that the overtime Granite Mill was required to pay
was a "reasonable expense incident to the delay" and therefore
recoverable as incidental damage under section 70A-2-715(l).

See

R. at 82. As the trial court correctly noted, section 70A-2-715(l)
does not require that the seller have notice of the importance of
that particular element of damage before the trial court can award
(or offset) it.

Id.

9

Ohline does not claim that Granite Mill failed to notify
Ohline of its intention to deduct its damages from the purchase
price, and in fact Granite Mill gave Ohline timely notice that it
was deducting its damages. See ex. 16-D.
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Ohline argues that overtime incurred as a result of a late
delivery of goods cannot be incidental damages under section 2715(1) but must be consequential damages under section 2-715(2)•
Subsection (2) allows a buyer to recover as consequential damages
resulting from the seller's breach of contract "any loss resulting
from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." See Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-2-715(2) . Ohline further argues that Granite Mill
was not entitled to offset or recover the overtime as consequential
damages because Ohline did not have reason to know of Granite
Mill's August 4, 1989, deadline at the time of contracting.10
Whether a particular element of damage is considered "loss
resulting in the ordinary course of events" under section 2-714,
incidental damages under section 2-715(1) or consequential damages
under section 2-715(2) is not always clear; the categories tend to
overlap.

See 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform

Commercial Code § 10-4 at 512, 514 & 519 & n.33 (3d ed. 1988).
CQinpare Jay y. gjmmernan CQ. y, general Mills, IVQf, 327 F. Supp.
1198f 1205 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (cost of overtime paid to third party in
effecting cover was recoverable as "incidental damages"), with
10

Ohline does not claim that the overtime could reasonably
have been prevented, except to the extent that it has argued that
Granite Mill did not reasonably mitigate its damages, an argument
addressed in part IV, supra.
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Kabco Equip, Specialists v. Budgetel. Inc., 440 N.E.2d 611, 614
(Ohio

Ct.

App.

1981)

consequential damages)•

(overtime

conceivably

recoverable

as

As the trial court noted, Granite Mill's

claimed offset seemed to fit within the last phrase of section 70A2-715(1)—"any other reasonable expense incident to the delay•"
See R. at 82.

But whether or not the overtime Granite Mill

incurred was properly considered incidental damages, as the trial
court concluded, or consequential damages, as Ohline argues, is
irrelevant since Granite Mill's claim met the requirements for both
incidental and consequential damages.
This court should affirm the trial court's ruling if it can do
so on any legal theory apparent on the record, even if the trial
court assigned an incorrect reason for its ruling. Allphin Realty.
Inc. v. Siner 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979); Goodsel v. Department
of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974).

Even if

the trial court erred in considering Granite Mill's claim as one
for incidental damages rather than consequential damages, the trial
court correctly concluded that Granite Mill was entitled to an
offset.

The only distinction Ohline relies on between incidental

and consequential damages is that consequential damages must be
foreseeable, and the trial court expressly found that Ohline was
aware of Granite Mill's time requirements and of the importance of
the delivery date when it agreed to have the shutters ready for
delivery by July 22, 1989. R. at 80-82.
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Although Ohline claimed

that it had no notice of Granite Mill's August 4 deadline, it
concedes that the record on this point "is in dispute."

Brief of

Appellant at 12. The trial court's finding that Ohline had notice
of the time constraints Granite Mill was working under was
supported

by

substantial

evidence.11

For

example,

Wayne

Hickenlooper testified that, when he negotiated the purchase order
with Ohline on behalf of Granite Mill, he discussed with Chuck Pace
that Granite Mill was

"up against

an August

4th drop dead

deadline." R. at 144. He further testified that between April and
June 1989 he had "[w]ell over a dozen" conversations with Chuck
Pace and that he discussed the August 4 deadline in at least half
of those conversations, including in a telephone conversation on
May 15, 1989, before Granite Mill reinstated its order.

Id. at

145-47.
The trial court further found that Mr. Pace's actions in
personally driving a pickup truck full of shutters from California
to Nevada on a Saturday afternoon showed that Ohline "was aware of
not only the importance of the date, the very last date, the third
week in July, but also of the defendant's obligation to have the
work completed by August 4."

Id. at 80.

11

Moreover, the court could assume that the trial court's
finding was supported by substantial evidence since Ohline has not
marshaled the evidence in support of that finding. See, e.g.,
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
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Because the record fully supports the trial court's conclusion
that Ohline had notice of Granite Mill's time requirements, Granite
Mill was entitled to an offset for the overhead it incurred,
regardless

of

whether

that

offset

was

properly

considered

incidental or consequential damages.
VI.
OHLINE'S CLAIM THAT GRANITE MILL'S ACTIONS EXCUSED ITS
UNTIMELY DELIVERY WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
Finally, Ohline argues that Granite Mill caused any delay in
shipment by cancelling its initial order of May 5, 1989, and not
providing Ohline with final dimensions until June 6, 1989, and that
Granite Mill should therefore have been denied an offset.
Ohline did not make this argument to the trial court, see R.
at 88-90 & 219-24, but raises it for the first time on appeal.
Issues not timely raised in the trial court are deemed waived on
appeal, and the appellate court is precluded from considering their
merits.

See LeBaron & Assocs.f Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.. 823

P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and cases cited therein.

For

an issue to be sufficiently raised in the trial court, "it must at
least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial
judge can consider it."

Id. (quoting James v. Prestonr 746 P.2d

799, 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).

Ohline's trial counsel made no

argument to the district court on this issue, cited no legal
authority on this issue, did not request findings on the issue and
- 23 -

did not object to the trial court's failure to make express
findings on the issue.
argument.

That alone is reason to reject the

See id.

Moreover, the argument is not supported by the record.

The

only evidence on this issue was Chuck Pace's testimony on rebuttal
that, if Ohline had received the final dimensions on May 22, 1989,
it could have had the shutters ready for delivery by July 21, 1989.
See R. at 217A. There was no evidence that the parties ever agreed
that Granite Mill would supply the final measurements on May 22,
1989, or even before June 6, 1989, nor was there any evidence that
Ohline7s agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment by the
third week in July was conditioned in any way on Granite Mill's
providing final measurements before June 6.

Even after Granite

Mill cancelled its first order, Ohline agreed that it would have
the shutters ready for shipment by the third week in July at the
latest.

See exs. 2-P & 17-D; R. at 138-39 & 146-47.

Ohline knew

at the time that it had not yet received the final measurements.
Even after Ohline received the final measurements, it never claimed
that it could not meet the July deadline.

Instead, it confirmed

its prior agreement to have the shutters ready for shipment by the
third week in July.12

In fact, when Gary Sandberg, Granite Mill's

12

In fact, Ohline's Shutter Production Order, see ex. 9-P,
gave the estimated shipping date as July 17, 1989. The order was
dated June 5, 1989. Mr. Pace testified that the production order
was not generated until Ohline had received the final working
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president, visited Ohline's offices the second week in July, both
Chuck Pace and Ohline's president assured him that the shutters
would be delivered by July 21, 1989. R. at 212. Because there is
no basis for Ohline's belated argument that Granite Mill was
somehow responsible for the late deliveries, the court should
reject that argument, even if Ohline has not waived it.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous
and support the trial court's conclusion that Granite Mill was
entitled to an offset for the overtime it had to pay as a result of
Ohline's untimely delivery of the shutters.

The judgment of the

trial court should therefore be affirmed.
DATED this ^ * *

day of May, 1992.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

BRUCE T. JONES, Esq.
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellee

(Original signature)
measurements. R. at 218. But even if Ohline had not received the
final measurements when it gave Granite Mill the estimated shipping
date of July 17, it knew at the time that it had not received the
final measurements and still thought it could complete the job by
July 17, well ahead of the July 22 deadline. See id. at 101, 112
& 217A-18.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OHLINE CORPORATION, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
]i
•
;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

GRANITE MILL, a Utah
corporation,

\i

Civil No. 900905549 CV

)

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant.

This matter was tried before the Third Judicial District
Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding, sitting without
a jury, on September 20, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by Gerald
M. Conder, Esq. and defendant was represented by Bruce T. Jones,
Esq. Having heard the evidence and reviewed the exhibits, the Court
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
duly

organized

At all relevant times, plaintiff was a corporation
and

existing

under

the

laws

of

the

State

of

California

and defendant was a corporation

duly organized

and

existing under the laws of the State of Utah.
2.

On or about April 25, 1989, defendant entered into

an agreement with the Las Vegas Hilton Corporation

(the "Hilton

Contract") regarding the remodeling of certain portions of the Las
Vegas Hilton Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada (the "Project").

Article

IV of the Hilton Contract required completion of the work on or
before August 4, 1989.
3.

In order to meet the required completion date in the

Hilton Contract of August 4, 1989, the defendant determined it
necessary to have all materials received or ready for shipment
sufficiently prior to such date in order to allow the materials to
be installed and the work completed on or before August 4, 1989.
4.

In furtherance of the Hilton Contract, the defendant

issued Purchase Order No. 2903 (the "Purchase Order") in early May,
1989, respecting

the manufacture

connection with the Project.
date,

the

Purchase

Order

and delivery

of materials

in

In regard to the required completion
contained

certain

conditions

provided, in relevant part:
"#3 finish samples will be sent the week of
5-8-89
#4 must be ready for pick-up 7-1-89"
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which

5.

After issuance of the Purchase Order, plaintiff

required as a term thereof

that defendant comply with certain

credit and payment requirements of plaintiff.
6.

After agreement respecting credit and payment terms,

on or about May 17, 1989, defendant reissued Purchase Order No.
2903, together with a check in the amount of $11,3 03.94 noting that
it was a deposit on "P.O. 2903 as agreed." The Purchase Order and
check were sent to plaintiff under cover of a letter dated May 17,
1989 from defendant which provided, in relevant part:
I have enclosed our check for the initial 25%
deposit as we agreed yesterday.
Chuck Pace stated that the shutters would be
ready for shipment by the third week in July—
"Hopefully Mid-Month."
7.

After receipt of the Purchase Order, check and letter

dated May 17, 1989, plaintiff issued Shutter Production Order No.
106127, dated June 5, 1989

(the "Shutter Production Order"),

respecting the Purchase Order and itemizing the materials to be
manufactured for the Project.

The Shutter Production Order noted

an estimated shipping date of July 17, 1989.
8.

In connection with the Hilton Contract, the Purchase

Order and the Shutter Production Order, the plaintiff and defendant
also had communications wherein the parties understood and agreed
that the materials to be furnished by plaintiff were to be finished

and ready for shipment no later than the last day of the third week
of July, or July 22, 1989.
9.

As a consequence of the completion date in the Hilton

Contract, and as evidenced by the Purchase Order, the Shutter
Production Order and the communication between the parties, the date
the materials were to be ready for shipment was understood to be
very important to defendant and guaranteed by plaintiff.
10.

Having received the Purchase Order, the letter from

defendant dated May 17, 1989, and having understood and agreed to
have the materials ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989,
the plaintiff at no time responded that this was not correct, but
confirmed the agreement pursuant to the Shutter Production Order.
11.

Time was of the essence in the performance of the

agreement between the parties and the agreement by plaintiff to have
the materials ready for shipment by no later than July 22, 1989 was
a specific and material term of the agreement relied upon by
defendant.
12.

The awareness and agreement of plaintiff to have the

materials ready for shipment by no later than July 22, 1989, is
evidenced by the delivery of a portion of the materials in a pickup
truck loaded and driven by Mr. Chuck Pace (an employee and sales
representative of plaintiff not typically charged with such duties) ,
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from California to Las Vegas, Nevada so that delivery of this first
shipment of the goods could be there by the evening of Saturday,
July 22, 1989.
13.

If the materials manufactured by plaintiff for the

Project had been ready for shipment on the agreed date of July 22,
1989, defendant could have installed the materials and completed its
work at the Project on or before August 4, 1989 without the
utilization of overtime labor.
14.

The materials manufactured by the plaintiff which

were agreed to be ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989,
were actually ready for shipment and shipped by plaintiff on various
dates commencing with the pickup truck driven by Mr. Pace, but with
a majority of the materials ready for shipment and shipped later the
following week subsequent to July 22, 1989.
15.

Plaintiff invoiced defendant a total of $45,328.62

for all materials delivered to the Project pursuant to the Purchase
Order. Defendant timely paid all of this amount with the exception
of $9,405.00, which was the amount of a credit memo issued by
defendant August 18, 1989 as a result of the late performance of
plaintiff.

16.

The defendant was diligent and made reasonable

efforts to mitigate the overtime labor and other incidental damages
incurred as a result of the late performance of plaintiff.
17.

The incidental damages incurred by defendant as a

result of the failure of plaintiff to have the materials ready for
shipment no later than July 22, 1989, as agreed, were $9,405.00, an
amount equal to or in excess of all amounts then otherwise owed by
defendant to plaintiff.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

A specific and material term of the agreement between

the parties relied upon by defendant was that the materials subject
to the Purchase Order to be manufactured by the plaintiff were to
be ready for shipment no later than July 22, 1989.
2.

The understanding, intent and agreement of the

parties with respect to the materials was that the plaintiff
guaranteed the materials would be ready for shipment, not merely
completed or nearly completed, but on trucks and in the process of
shipment, no later than July 22, 1989.
3.

Plaintiff breached the agreement when it failed to

have the materials ready for shipment on or before July 22, 1989.
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4.

Plaintiff had notice, and was aware, of the agreement

between the parties to have the materials ready for shipment no
later than July 22, 1989, and the reliance of the defendant thereon.
5.

The measure of damages for plaintiff's breach is the

incidental damages under § 70A-2-715 Utah Code Ann, resulting from
a plaintiff's breach and including "Any other reasonable expenses
incident to the delay."

The damages

in this

instance were

incidental to the delay of plaintiff in breach of the agreement
between the parties to have the materials ready for shipment on or
before July 22, 1989.
6.

The

defendant

showed

appropriate

diligence

in

mitigating damages and was reasonable in its payment of overtime in
order to complete the installation of the materials and its work at
the Project under the Hilton Contract on or before Aucjust 4, 1989.
The incidental damages incurred by defendant resulting from the
breach by plaintiff were $9,405.00, an amount equal to or in excess
of all amounts otherwise owed by defendant to plaintiff.
DATED this

S ^

day of

/^uL^j^iA^jLMt^l991.

BY/THE COURT:

MA^=
/ /Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
I District Judge

^-.-AT'TEST-^By Jll.

.
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